I. INTRODUCTION
The existence and enforcement of Australia's continuous disclosure laws is said to be fundamental to the efficient operation and protection of its financial and securities markets.
1 It is now an established precept of market regulation that price-sensitive information should be disclosed in an accurate and timely manner in order to facilitate efficient price discovery and to promote market confidence and integrity. 2 It has been said by one court that the purpose of the continuous disclosure laws is:
"to enhance the integrity and efficiency of Australian capital markets by ensuring that the market is fully informed. The timely disclosure of market sensitive information is essential to maintaining and increasing the confidence of investors in Australian markets, and to improving the accountability of company management. It is also integral to minimising incidences of insider trading and other market distortions." The most recently implemented enforcement measure, which falls solely within the purview of ASIC, is the power to issue infringement notices to non-compliant disclosing entities. This infringement notice regime was introduced to address the "less serious" breaches of continuous disclosure obligations where traditional alternative enforcement mechanisms might otherwise be less effective or relatively unsuitable given their associated costs. 5 Although they are therefore not the most serious form of sanction that ASIC may pursue against a non-compliant entity, [355] . 4 The other market operators in Australia, such as the Bendigo Stock Exchange (BSX) and the Stock Exchange of Newcastle (NSX), each have their own listing rules that stipulate the continuous disclosure obligations applicable to their listed disclosing entities. Given the significant size and scope of the ASX, any reference in this article to "market operator" or "listing rules" refers to the ASX and the ASX Listing Rules, respectively. 5 For discussion of these other mechanisms, see Part IIB and Part V.
infringement notices have proven to be controversial. 6 This article evaluates the practical application of the infringement notice regime since its inception. Such an inquiry is intended to be instructive not only for evaluating ASIC's current application of the regime, but also for administering its prospective operation given the expanded use of infringement notices in new contexts.
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In Part II we review briefly the background and mechanics involved in the infringement notice regime. This is followed by an outline of our research methodology in Part III and a trend-analysis in Part IV of all infringement notices issued by ASIC to date. In Part V we consider the regime in its wider context amongst the alternative enforcement mechanisms available to ASIC for a breach of continuous disclosure. In Part VI we explore the policy issues and future implications that emerge in light of how infringement notices are currently being employed by ASIC. Part VII concludes.
II. AUSTRALIA'S INFRINGEMENT NOTICE REGIME

A. Background
The infringement notice regime constitutes one of the more significant developments in Australia's continuous disclosure regulatory framework since a statutory framework was introduced in 1994. This framework itself evolved from a growing perception that the previous regulatory system, in which the ASX enforced the continuous disclosure requirements exclusively through its listing rules, was problematic and lacked effectiveness. 8 The subsequent introduction of a statutory regime stipulating continuous disclosure requirements and sanctions to support the listing rules through the Corporate Law Reform Act 1994 (Cth), 9 combined with gradual reforms to the regime, have over time resulted in a strengthening of ASIC's powers and ASIC gaining a far more prominent enforcement role than the ASX.
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Despite these gradual augmentations to the continuous disclosure laws and enforcement measures, there still existed a perceived gap in the enforcement framework. 11 Of particular concern was the lack of effective protection against "less serious [alleged] breaches" of ss 674(2) and 675(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) . 12 This concern was partially driven by the existing enforcement actions that ASIC could pursue against non-compliant entities occasionally spiralling into lengthy, expensive and cumbersome court proceedings that were consequently not efficacious in addressing such minor breaches and in encouraging timely compliance by disclosing entities. 13 As such, an underlying argument and rationale developed supporting an infringement notice enforcement regime which would offer an alternative, quicker, more responsive and efficient mechanism targeted towards those "less serious" continuous disclosure contraventions, and which would thereby encourage compliance amongst disclosing entities with respect to their continuous disclosure obligations.
14 There was also a spate of highly publicised instances of listed entities failing to inform the market of material price-sensitive information. In particular, civil penalty sanctions were introduced for financial services in 2001, paving the way for ASIC and third parties who had been damaged by a contravention to initiate civil proceedings against the relevant disclosing entity for a range of remedies, such as pecuniary penalties, compensation orders and publication orders. (Though third parties could only avail themselves of the compensation orders). The principal sanctions available to the ASX were comparatively limited, the primary ones being suspension or delisting of the contravening disclosing entity. See, e.g., Randall v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd [2004] NSWSC 411 (noted in ibid). In particular, some listed entities were singled out as failing to make full and timely disclosure of material price-sensitive information in relation to their listed securities. Explanatory Memorandum, CLERP 9, at [4.218] . As such, both ASIC and the ASX reportedly determined that an "improved culture of compliance" was required with respect to these listed companies and their continuous disclosure obligations: ibid. This consequently made the purpose of the infringement notice regime of particular significance to those listed disclosing entities that are the most actively traded and have the highest participation rates by retail shareholders: ibid at [4.220] .
for ASIC to issue infringement notices, thereby providing ASIC with an alternative remedy to (in particular) civil and criminal proceedings to address minor continuous disclosure contraventions. 16 The infringement notice regime was introduced by the Rule 3.1 which provides that "Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity's securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that information." There are exceptions to this rule in Listing Rule 3.1A, and these exceptions allow certain information to be withheld by the disclosing entity.
Section 675(2) applies to unlisted disclosing entities (this includes an entity that has issued securities pursuant to a disclosure document lodged with ASIC and there are at least 100 investors holding these securities As previously indicated, ASIC states in Regulatory Guide 73 that the infringement notice regime is intended to apply to less serious breaches of continuous disclosure obligations.
At its core, the regime comprises a tiered system of fixed financial penalties that apply to an issuee based on factors relating to its market capitalisation on the "relevant day." 24 The quantum of the voluntary penalty that applies to an issuee for the alleged contravention of ss 674(2) or 675(2) is categorised in Table 1 : 
Tier 3
$33,000
Source: ss 1317DAE(2) and (6), 674(2), 675(2).
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ASIC can activate the procedure to issue an infringement notice by acting on its own observations or on information referred to it by the ASX. This procedure involves 10 stages, which are summarised below:
26 24 "Relevant day" is defined in s 1317DAE(6) as "the last day of the financial year in relation to which the latest financial report by the disclosing entity has been lodged with ASIC before the infringement notice is issued". 25 A disclosing entity that has previously contravened its ss 674(2) or 675(2) obligations will be subject to the subsequently higher penalty tier than would otherwise apply. In the case of a listed Tier 1 disclosing entity in this situation, it is likely in practice to move beyond the infringement notice regime and instead become predisposed to civil or criminal sanctions. See Cooper, above n 17, at 13. Pursuant to s 1317DAE(3), for an alleged breach of s 674(2) the penalty for a Tier 2 entity is $100,000 and for a Tier 3 entity is $66,000, and pursuant to s 1317DAE(5), for an alleged breach of s 675(2) the penalty is $66,000 if: "the disclosing entity has at any time been convicted of an offence based on subsection 674(2) or 675(2);" or "a civil penalty order under Part 9.4B has at any time been made against the disclosing entity in relation to a contravention of subsection 674(2) or 675(2);" or "the disclosing entity has at any time breached an enforceable undertaking given to ASIC under section 93AA of the ASIC Act in relation to the requirements of subsection 674(2) or 675(2 . In order to comply with the infringement notice, the issuee must pay the penalty amount and either make a disclosure to the market or lodge a document containing any specific information that is required by the infringement notice, within the compliance period (28 days, unless an extension has been granted). Against this background and context of infringement notices, we now examine ASIC's use of this enforcement action to date.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Overview
During the period from the commencement of the infringement notice regime in 2004 until 30 June 2011, ASIC issued a total of 14 infringement notices that were complied with by the issuee. It is important to note that the data relating to infringement notices published by ASIC is limited to infringement notices with which the issuee has complied. This is because s 1317DAJ of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that ASIC may only publish details of an infringement notice where there is compliance with the notice.
As summarised in Table 2 , the issuees are (or were at the time) all listed companies operating in a variety of industries and contexts. There are two factors to bear in mind when considering this list of companies in relation to which ASIC has issued infringement notices. First, each issuance, to a substantial degree, depends upon the unique facts surrounding each particular (alleged) contravention. Accordingly, any analysis must be sensitive to the importance of context in each instance. A broader trend-based methodology that incorporates context as a factor is therefore adopted in this analysis. Second, it is important to acknowledge that a higher number of infringement notices would lend greater certainty to the trends that we can extract from our analysis.
B. Methodology
In order to evaluate how ASIC has utilised its power to issue infringement notices, we assess (i) the operation of the regime itself, and (ii) 
IV. TRENDS IN ASIC'S USE OF THE INFRINGEMENT NOTICE REGIME
A. Company/Industry Factor
The company/industry factor identifies the areas of the Australian stock market and economy that the issuees derive from. This information is summarised in the first two columns of Table 2 according to the Global Industry Classification Standard ("GICS")
for sectors and industries. This trend of application of the infringement notice regime solely towards these four sectors might suggest that these particular sectors are potentially susceptible to higher rates of non-compliance with continuous disclosure obligations. This is reinforced by the observation that each sector has incurred multiple issuances of infringement notices. It may also be indicative of the sectors in which ASX and ASIC particularly focus their monitoring and enforcement activities.
B. Penalty Quantum Factor
As discussed in Part IIB, the penalty amount for an infringement notice for listed entities is a function of the market capitalisation of the issuee, and whether it has previously contravened its continuous disclosure obligations. The year of issuance factor illustrates the annual incidence and annual rate of issuance of infringement notices since the inception of the regime. As indicated in Table 3 
D. Time to Issuance Factor
Another factor to consider is the time taken between the alleged continuous disclosure breach occurring and ASIC issuing the infringement notice. This indicates the rapidity of ASIC's response and provides insight into whether the infringement notice regime is achieving one of its intended primary goals -to deliver a quicker and more efficient remedy against relatively minor continuous disclosure law infractions. 38 ASIC has stated that it will generally aim to issue an infringement notice within 3 months (90 days) of identifying an alleged breach. 39 As depicted in Table 3 , however, the average time that ASIC has taken to respond to a contravention by issuing an infringement notice is 248 days, with a minimum time of 133 days (Promina Group Ltd) and a maximum of 357 days (Avastra Ltd).
There are a number of implications to draw from these findings. potentially take less time to design and implement than the average 8.2 months that the infringement notice regime currently takes. 41 Second, the fact that every infringement notice issued has taken longer than the stated goal of 90 days suggests that this is likely a systemic problem inherent in the procedure rather than due to any extraneous or contextual factors (such as the particular issuee, its industry, sector, size, and the circumstances of the alleged breach). As such, we can infer that the time between the alleged contravention and the investigation commencing and/or the 'Investigation' to 'Infringement notice issued' stages of the issuance process 42 are taking longer than anticipated by ASIC to complete, impeding the rapidity of ASIC's response to the alleged contraventions in question.
E. Time to Announcement Factor
This factor indicates the time that ASIC takes to publicly announce its issuance of an infringement notice after the alleged contravention (time of "offence" to 
F. Context Factor
Extracting trends from the contexts of the alleged breaches is perhaps the most challenging aspect of this analysis. As Table 4 indicates, although infringement notices have only been issued in four sectors so far, the contexts underlying these issuances are very diverse. There are several matters that arise for discussion from this data. First, all 14 infringement notices concern contraventions involving non-disclosures of material information rather than contraventions for misleading disclosures. This may suggest that ASIC does not consider infringement notices to be an effective response to misleading disclosure violations of the continuous disclosure laws. These findings are significant for several reasons. They indicate that companies from the four sectors identified in Part IVA can be inefficient at distributing both positive and negative news in compliance with the continuous disclosure provisions, and do commit minor contraventions in relation to both types of news. In addition, these findings may suggest a possible pattern that disclosing entities in the Materials sector are particularly imperfect at distributing positive news to the market in a compliant fashion, and that such entities may be more likely to attract infringement notices for this reason. 47 The findings may also indicate that the ASX and ASIC's monitoring and enforcement of minor continuous disclosure contraventions is effective for detecting both positive and negative types of non-disclosure.
45 This is further discussed in Part V. 46 The Promina Group Ltd and Rio Tinto Ltd infringement notices involved news relating to merger and takeover discussions respectively which could be viewed positively or negatively depending on the particular market participant. We have therefore classified them in a separate positive/negative non-disclosure category. 47 Indeed, this may be an underlying reason for the "clumping" observed in the Materials sector in Part IVC above.
The third matter that can be drawn from which also suggests that in such contexts ASIC is particularly stringent in the standards it requires regarding continuous disclosure.
Taking a broader perspective, the contexts identified above suggest possible areas in which it may be more difficult for a disclosing entity to satisfy its continuous disclosure obligations to the standards expected by ASIC. That is, it may be more challenging for companies involved in takeovers, mergers, drug trials or the Materials sector in general (for instance), to maintain continuous compliance to the required standards. This raises the more fundamental question of just how long companies should have to disclose relevant information, particularly as it appears so heavily dependent upon the prevailing context.
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In summary, our analysis of the application of the infringement notice regime suggests that infringement notices have so far been narrowly applied to the Materials, Information Technology, Health Care and Financials sectors of the economy; are not as efficient or responsive as intended (especially with respect to stages 1 -7 of the issuance process or commencement of the process after the alleged contravention); are being applied to both positive and negative non-disclosure events; and are being applied to all types of companies in terms of market capitalisation (size) in a variety of contexts.
V. ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE UTILISATION OF ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES
In this part of the article, we undertake a broader-level analysis by examining how the infringement notice regime has been utilised compared with ASIC's alternative continuous disclosure enforcement measures. We review ASIC's application of its alternative enforcement measures to continuous disclosure contraventions since the inception of the infringement notice regime. As part of this analysis, we consider strategic regulation theory and apply it to derive a continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid model, which encapsulates the key sanctions that we focus on in the analysis: enforceable undertakings, civil penalties and criminal penalties.
A. Strategic Regulation Theory
Applying strategic regulation theory to various aspects of ASIC's enforcement framework has been undertaken in earlier studies. credible sanctions -of escalating degrees of severity and compulsoriness -that it can threaten to utilise and deploy whenever a contravention occurs.
This hierarchy of sanctions is traditionally depicted as an 'enforcement pyramid', with each vertical position indicating the severity and voluntariness of each sanction (with the more severe and mandatory measures towards the apex), and the width of each punishment row indicating its theoretical rate of use and, inversely, its expected deterrent value (greater width signifies higher use though the measure has less deterrent effect).
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We employ this concept for the purposes of our analysis to create a 'continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid' in order to analyse the infringement notice regime within the context of ASIC's other main enforcement actions relating to continuous disclosure contraventions.
55 See Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay, above n 50; Bird, Chow, Lenne and Ramsay, above n 50.
B. Continuous Disclosure Enforcement Pyramid
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FIGURE 1 -CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE ENFORCEMENT PYRAMID
According to this model, education and persuasion are (theoretically) ASIC's least severe and more commonly utilised enforcement responses against continuous disclosure breaches, followed by enforceable undertakings, infringement notices, civil penalties (compensation and monetary sanctions) and lastly criminal penalties, representing the most severe and mandatory sanction. It is possible for the response against a non-compliant disclosing entity to move higher up the pyramid if its contravention is severe enough to justify this or if it has already incurred lower-level sanctions and these have not been complied with. 57 Of most relevance for our analysis are enforceable undertakings, civil penalties and criminal penalties given that they have comparable or higher levels of severity to infringement notices.
56 This continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid only reflects ASIC's available enforcement sanctions within the continuous disclosure context, not those sanctions available to the ASX in this context or those available to ASIC in other areas (that is, in non-continuous disclosure law contravention scenarios). 57 See Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay, above n 50.
Criminal penalties Civil penalties
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Two points can be made in relation to the continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid. First, other authors have devised similar pyramids. 58 However, there is disagreement about the structure of the pyramid with some having enforceable undertakings above infringement notices and others having them on the same level.
The fact that authors cannot agree on the structure of the pyramid may indicate some limitations in its use. Second, our later analysis indicates there are limitations in endeavouring to classify the alternative enforcement measures in a hierarchy as reflected in the enforcement pyramid -it seems as though ASIC may move one above the other depending on the context of the alleged contravention.
(i) Enforceable Undertakings
Enforceable undertakings are a particularly useful comparison because, like infringement notices, they are voluntary and are invoked by breaches involving similar magnitudes of severity. 59 An enforceable undertaking is a flexible enforcement remedy that gives effect to an administrative settlement between ASIC and the contravening disclosing entity.
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Since their introduction in 1998, enforceable undertakings have been employed as an alternative to court proceedings and other administrative actions in order to influence behaviour and instil a 'culture of compliance' amongst market participants. 61 Enforceable undertakings are a court-enforceable agreement voluntarily accepted by ASIC and the party involved (and can be initiated by either) to perform or not perform certain agreed upon actions to remedy the alleged breach.
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Their advantage lies in their ability to reflect a negotiated and tailored resolution in a timely and cost-effective manner that is agreeable to both parties. 63 They also can compel disclosing entities to improve their internal compliance arrangements to minimise the chances of any contraventions occurring in the future. 64 Evincing the utility of this enforcement mechanism, ASIC has so far agreed to 303 enforceable undertakings since 1998. However, as summarised in Table 5, only nine (approximately three per cent) of these concern alleged breaches of continuous disclosure obligations. 65 Only three enforceable undertakings of this subset (Multiplex Ltd, TZ Ltd and Nufarm Ltd) were accepted during the operation of the infringement notice regime. (60) percent of an agreed amount, as quantified in this Enforceable Undertaking, the registered holders of the eligible securities can elect not to proceed with the offer; (c) If ASIC had proceeded, court orders would have been confined to a declaration of contravention and a maximum pecuniary penalty of $1 million; and (d) The undertaking provides an ongoing benefit by way of improved Disclosure Policies and Procedures that Multiplex has agreed to put in place, which are to be consistent with industry best practice, monitored by an independent expert.') Additionally, it was noted that 'ASIC has agreed to accept an enforceable undertaking…as an alternative to taking a civil penalty proceeding…' at [1.23]).
is, it demonstrates an instance where infringement notices are a 'non-alternative' sanction for ASIC to administer when such a continuous disclosure breach has occurred. One question that should be asked, however, is whether Multiplex's alleged contravention in fact constituted a 'minor' contravention of the continuous disclosure laws, 71 and therefore whether infringement notices could reasonably be regarded as a viable option at all in this situation. Nevertheless, the fact that ASIC pursued an enforceable undertaking rather than a more severe penalty in the form of civil proceedings does indicate ASIC's opinion that the breach was minor enough to warrant such a remedy, and therefore illustrates a limitation of infringement notices in their application to certain minor breaches of continuous disclosure obligations.
In terms of the continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid, we cannot therefore affix infringement notices definitively above enforceable undertakings for every continuous disclosure breach -ASIC may move one above the other depending on the context of the alleged contravention. Complicating this observation is the more recent Nufarm Ltd decision, which is the first instance of both an infringement notice and an enforceable undertaking being issued for the same alleged contravention. The enforceable undertaking was issued primarily to address Nufarm Ltd's purportedly deficient internal processes, whereas the infringement notice penalty appeared to be more targeted towards addressing the breach itself. This example not only highlights how interchangeable these two enforcement measures are in practice, but additionally how they can also be combined in this regulatory model to form a response to an alleged breach.
Overall, ASIC's use of the infringement notice regime appears to be reasonably high when compared to enforceable undertakings. However, the divergent application of the two enforceable undertakings in the TZ Ltd and Multiplex Ltd matters, coupled with the combined approach adopted by ASIC in the Nufarm Ltd matter, renders it unclear whether infringement notices and enforceable undertakings can be 'true alternatives' in resolving continuous disclosure contraventions.
(ii) Civil Penalties
There are only three matters in which ASIC has pursued civil proceedings for breach of the continuous disclosure requirements in the time since the infringement notice regime commenced operation. being knowingly concerned in the company's non-disclosure of its unexpected losses. 75 However, the prosecutions were unsuccessful. 76 As is theorised in the continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid, criminal sanctions are comparatively more severe and less commonly implemented than infringement notices.
VI. IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS ASIC TAKING INFRINGEMENT NOTICE ENFORCEMENT ACTION?
Several issues emerge from this analysis of the application of the infringement notice regime. In this Part, we tie our findings together to determine where ASIC is taking enforcement action with respect to minor continuous disclosure contraventions.
To begin with, an important issue emerging from our analysis is the length of time that is currently required to issue an infringement notice after an alleged breach has occurred. In Part IVD we found that ASIC currently takes 248 days on average to commence and complete stages 1 ('Investigation') to 7 ('Infringement notice issued') of the implementation process, which is far longer than the 90 day intended general target that ASIC is aiming for. As a result, we concluded that infringement notices are not a definitively quicker or more efficient alternative mechanism for less serious breaches of continuous disclosure obligations, thereby calling into question one of the regime's central justifications for its operation. 77 Furthermore, in our analysis we hypothesised that this length of time is largely a systemic issue; that is, due principally to imperfections within the procedure for issuing infringement notices rather than due to the influence of any exogenous factors. It would be appropriate for the infringement notice issuance procedure to be reviewed -it may be possible that the number of stages in the procedure is excessive and/or that aspects of specific stages are too time-intensive and inefficient. A detailed internal review of each stage of the process may yield a more effective approach to issuing infringement notices, allowing the regime to achieve one of its more important goals by reducing deployment time.
Another important result from our analysis concerns the influence of context on a company's continuous disclosure requirements. We found in Part IVF that the durations of non-disclosure varied significantly given the individual context. This is tied to the broader policy question of what the relevant standard required for companies to publicly disclose material price-sensitive information should be. The current standard for listed entities, operating through ASX Listing Rule 3.1, requires a disclosing entity to 'immediately' disclose such information to the market. The question is whether a more flexible standard is preferable when it comes to these minor contraventions, such that disclosure should be made 'as soon as practicable' in order to account for the specific context. A further research issue is whether a more flexible disclosure standard, as well as greater instruction from the regulator regarding these contextual considerations, may benefit disclosing entities (especially those belonging to the four sectors identified in Part IVA) as well as the transparency and consistency of the regime's application.
It also remains to be seen whether infringement notices can be applied to misleading and deceptive disclosure breaches of the continuous disclosure rules, rather than solely to non-disclosure breaches as is currently the case. ASIC has so far employed its alternative enforcement measures illustrated in the continuous disclosure enforcement pyramid, in particular enforceable undertakings and civil proceedings, to address these types of contraventions. With respect to enforceable undertakings, our comparative utilisation analysis suggests that they are not conclusively a 'true alternative' to infringement notices in all breach situations. Although ASIC did apply both measures to rectify Nufarm Ltd's alleged contravention, this raises a question as to how ASIC will select between the two in any given instance (that is, beyond the theoretical factors that ASIC takes into account when evaluating enforceable undertakings in general), or whether a combined approach is going to be more common. Based on the fact that the TZ Ltd and Multiplex Ltd undertakings each involved improvements to their apparently deficient compliance systems, it may be that if ASIC primarily perceives the opportunity to improve the internal compliance measures of a disclosing entity, it chooses an enforceable undertaking, whereas if it regards the disclosing entity's compliance systems as comparatively adequate and merely ineffectively utilised in a given instance, it issues an infringement notice (or implements both measures where some operational deficiency exists). The effect of an infringement notice is therefore mainly to ensure that a disclosing entity's compliance systems are properly employed, and as such, the greater number of infringement notices issued over enforceable undertakings in the relevant time period may signal a higher incidence of non-effective systems use compared to deficient systems existing in the companies receiving infringement notices.
VII. CONCLUSION
ASIC's utilisation of its infringement notice regime against relatively minor contraventions of the continuous disclosure laws is fundamentally designed to promote the efficient operation and protection of Australia's securities markets. In our trend-based and comparative utilisation analyses of the 14 infringement notices issued to date, we extracted a number of notable trends and generated several policy questions that have implications for the operation of the regime going forward.
There are areas of the regime's application that are appropriate for review, particularly in relation to the time to issuance, the efficiency of the issuance process,
the need for contextual instruction as to disclosure, the relevant disclosure standard required in such contraventions, and the interplay between infringement notices and enforceable undertakings. Improvement of the regime is aimed at ensuring this enforcement mechanism is effective and relevant to ASIC's monitoring and enforcement activities.
